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Architectural discourse in the 1970s famously deve-
loped a structuralist model of architectural signi-
ﬁcation. But the most advanced architecture in this
“age of discourse” could never be explained by the
very model it helped generate. For example, lingui-
stics-based interpretations could not account for
the brooding, melancholy silence of the work of
Aldo Rossi; the radically reductive “decompositi-
ons” and archaeologies of Peter Eisenman; even less
the carnivalesque excesses of John Hejduk; or the
“cinegrammatic” delirium of Bernard Tschumi. I
want to suggest that a more adequate interpretati-
on of the architecture of the neo-avant-garde must
account for the complex machinery of Architec-
ture’s Desire. Marks of desire form a pattern in the
works, a structured ﬁeld, which I will summarize
here.
Desire arises from the Lacanian triad, Imaginary-
Symbolic-Real. Since issues of perception, subject
formation, language, image, and code are funda-
mental both in the architecture theory of the 1970s
and in Jacque Lacan’s discourse, and since those
two discourses are almost exactly contemporaneous,
it is not arbitrary that we start here.
It is perhaps easiest to think of Lacan’s three
orders as force-ﬁelds which operate in every experi-
ence or act (including architectural experiences and
acts), each one bringing its own particular characte-
ristics and inﬂuence and possibilities. They are three
turns in a Borromean knot (Lacan’s metaphor),
three laminates of a single reality, but they can be
broken apart and used as a system of classiﬁcation.
The Imaginary Order comprises parts that are
inﬁnitely substitutable for one another—what Lacan
called objets petit autre. These are the objects of
desire, or better analogs for the single object of
desire, L' Autre, or the big Other, that has been lost
and cannot be recovered directly. Aldo Rossi called
the Other of architecture the “Analogous City.”
Rossi’s architectural types, which arise inthe “Ana-
logous City,” can be placed in the Architectural
Imaginary. Rossi understood architectural types as
entities, analogues of the social text itself. Types
operate mimetically, which is a characteristic of the
Imaginary made vivid by Lacan’s mirror image
model. And like the objects in the Imaginary, the
typological images from the Analogous City desig-
nate the original, deﬁning status of man—“[the
Analogous City] concerns the collective imaginati-
on,” Rossi said; it is “a synthesis of a series of [soci-
al and architectural] values.” 
While Rossi’s typological, analogical obsessions
seem to be a way of constantly conﬁrming the
determinate presence of the traditional European
city—refracting its historical logic of form through a
neo-Enlightenment lens in contingent, contradic-
tory, and quasi-surreal ways—their peculiar mne-
monic function also makes it possible to see in
them a new beauty in precisely that which is va-
nishing. The originality of Rossi’s work may well be
its capacity to convey, alternately with melancholy
or unblinking disenchantment, that the traditional
practice of architecture itself is being forever lost.
Dieses ist lange her is the title of one of Rossi’s most
enigmatic drawings. It is a perfect picture of the
desiring ﬁeld which is the Architectural Imaginary.
No one has grasped the radical anachronicity of
the Analogous City better than Peter Eisenman.
Eisenman characterizes Rossi’s work as signifying
the impossibility of meaning in our own time:
“Incapable of believing in reason, uncertain of the
signiﬁcance of his objects, man [has lost] his capaci-
ty for signifying… The context which gave ideas
and objects their previous signiﬁcance is gone.”
Then he writes, “Rossi’s ‘rationalism’ … consists in
the combination of logic—the conscious—and the
analogic—the shadow… Rossi’s conscious images
exist only as a key to their shadow imagery. It is
their intrinsic, often unconscious content which
confronts the more problematic and perhaps funda-
mental reality of the cultural condition today.”
The passage rather precisely invokes the La-
canian Real, what Eisenman calls the shadowy
unconscious of the ana-logic, which is “behind” the
Imaginary. The Real is what exceeds Imaginary
identiﬁcations—all that typology fails to include. It
is something that persists only as failed, missed, in
a shadow, and dissolves as soon as we try to grasp
it in its positive nature. This Architectural Real is
the place of the void opened up by the Imaginary
exclusion of the polymorphous wealth of architec-
ture beyond what can be imagined and identiﬁed
as a type.
Lacan’s Symbolic Order, then, designates the
endeavor to bring to light something about the
Real, but backwards, as it were, not through images
but from its structural effects. The Symbolic Order
is the realm of language and the law, of authority
and its exchanges. And Eisenman’s work around the
1978 project for Canarregio is Symbolic is exactly
this way. 
Eisenman’s early work was concerned almost
exclusively with isolating and elaborating architec-
ture’s symbolic elements and operations that would
ensure autonomy and self-reﬂexivity of the archi-
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tectural object and its structured determinants. At
Canarregio, the grid of Le Corbusier's unrealized
Venice Hospital project operates as the absent big
Other—the law, the authority, the code, the archi-
tectural unconscious, what Lacan called the Name
of the Father. Le Corbusier’s grid is reduced to a
geometrical abstraction and replicated onto the
irregular fabric of the adjacent site. (And it should
be emphasized that there is no better metaphor for
the Symbolic than the grid.) Then Eisenman’s own
previously worked out House XIa—itself a formal
record of the history of its own formation, compri-
sing nothing more than a series of ﬁlm-like stills
that trace the steps from one state of the object to
the next—is multiplied across the grid. 
With Canarregio, one discovers the existence of
certain bindings and constraints: the constraints of
the architectural code or grammar, and of the social
order, the social unconscious—in short, the structu-
res of which Lacan has named the Symbolic. 
We can summarize: 
118
Rossi
Imaginary
parts
analogic images
absence, loss of maternal plenitutde
memory of place,identiﬁcation
diachronic
iteration
mimesis
Eisenman
Symbolic
total system, ground, inventory
digital codes
presence of dead father 
(Name of the Father)
counter-memory, tracing place
synchronic
repetition
difference, alterity
Late in 1973 John Hejduk traveled to Zurich for an
exhibition of his work together with Aldo Rossi’s at
the eth where Rossi was teaching. In putting the
works of these two architects together, the curators
probably meant to elucidate the highly reduced and
precise formal, geometrical research that Rossi and
Hejduk shared. But what Hejduk saw—for the ﬁrst
time—were Rossi’s provocative and haunting dra-
wings, especially for the Cemetery of San Cataldo at
Modena (1971). The encounter with Rossi cut a
crease in Hejduk’s career, which between 1973 and
1975 would fold back on itself in a reexamination
of accomplishments thus far and a reconsideration
in the light of what Hejduk saw in Zurich. 
What struck Hejduk in Rossi’s work was not
simply a typology of reduced form comparable to
Hejduk’s own: a limited range of single-volume ele-
ments, geometrically precise, ﬁxed and continuous-
ly reﬁned. What struck him was the discrepancy
between Rossi’s stated intent to subsume all of the
architectural imagination into a ﬁnite, iterable typo-
logy and the dimension of Rossi’s work that eludes
or resists such enclosure—the discrepancy between
the Imaginary and the Real. In the Modena project
Hejduk noticed, for example, the estrangements
and detournments from Ledoux’s ideal city of
Chaux, Boullée’s cenotaph, and Piranesi’s Campo
Marzio; the latent references to the Sachlichkeit of
Hilberseimer, Loos, Hannes Meyer; but also allusi-
ons to the paintings of de Chirico and Morandi, the
ﬁlms of Fellini and Visconti, and the novels of
Raymond Chandler and Raymond Roussel (all of
whom, we found out later, were among Rossi’s
inspirations). Hedjuk heard the multimedia babel
behind Rossi’s silence. The guardian spirits of the
Analogous City were whispering to him. And he
wondered about unleashing all that Rossi had sup-
pressed.
The Wall House was Hejduk’s only available
device to begin to address what he took to be a
challenge from Rossi. The Wall had the potential of
radical ﬁguration, and that potential would be used
by Hejduk to structure a desiring ﬁeld. Hejduk’s
preliminary response (in what seems at ﬁrst a sur-
prisingly tentative staking out of new territory) was
the Cemetery for the Ashes of Thought, 1975, for
the Venice Biennale, in which Hejduk took his
already worked-out Wall House 3, reanimated it to
stand as sentinel in a lagoon across from the old
Molino Stucky building in Venice.1 “The little house
was colored overlooking the monochromatic, syste-
mic, European world. What I am doing is I am the
questionnaire upon the question. I am the interro-
gation upon the interrogator. So when Rossi and all
those things in Europe are going on, the totalitarian
stuff which has to do with deep political and social
meanings, then I answer it with The Cemetery for
the Ashes of Thought.”
Other than the Wall House and the mill, the
proposal is for nothing more than a courtyard de-
ﬁned by low walls with holes (“holes,” not niches)
holding containers with ashes, and plaques with the
titles and authors of canonic Western literature. An
existing abandoned mill, a house designed that
same year, a courtyard—next to nothing. And yet,
Hejduk himself sees this project as a turning point
in his work: “People did see that [project], but
baby, nobody talks about that project. The Ceme-
tery for the Ashes of Thought was one man’s con-
frontation with that whole European condition.” 
All of which suggests that the radical lack we
feel with regard to this project is quite fundamen-
tal.
The Cemetery for the Ashes of Thought precisely
constructs an elementary diagram of desire, accor-
ding to which the unavailability or interdiction of a
desired object, the Other—in this case, the Thought
that is both dematerialized and made manifest in
the ashes—becomes an attracting void of enormous
signiﬁcance. We recall Lacan’s citation of Heideg-
ger: “The vessel's thingness does not lie at all in the
material of which it consists, but in the void that
holds.” It is the void at the center of the Real that
organizes desire. The cemetery is a template of
desire. 
Lacan stresses vigorously that this particular
nameless Other, the void, the Thing, is the primary
object on which is grounded all possible subject-
object relations, and equally, the empty site that
remains when entry into the Symbolic is complete.
What is more, Lacan uses architecture as a primary
example, citing the ancient temple as “a construc-
tion around emptiness that designates the place of
the Thing.” In Hejduk’s cemetery, the Thing is the
Thought, the central object of Western culture that
cannot be signiﬁed even as it is the event horizon
of all signiﬁcation, that must be continually “refo-
und” but was “never there in the ﬁrst place to be
lost,” (Lacan), in comparison with which all other
objects—those Imaginary objects that both Hejduk
and Rossi would repeat almost obsessively—will be
more unsatisfactory substitutes. 
Cemetery for the Ashes of Thought was for the
1975 Biennale. Teatro del Mondo was for the 1980
Biennale. Did Rossi take something back from
Hejduk?
After this encounter with Rossi, Hejduk would
construct his architectural Masques. In the tradition
of the Italian maschera and the festival architecture
of Inigo Jones, the masques propose various inter-
acting architectural characters and human inhabi-
tants—architectural troubadours, vagabonds, and
itinerants—that travel in caravans from city to city
(Berlin, Vladivostok, Hanover), twisting the munda-
ne urbanism of their sites into carnivalesque narra-
tive events. The taking of place is the very mode of
being of the Masques. The Masques open the lens
more daringly onto architecture’s otherness, to
eruptions from the order of the Real, as Hejduk
begins to catalogue his multiple, idiosyncratic cod-
ings of architectural elements—his menagerie of
angels, animals, martyrs, and machines; his stylistic
preference for basic geometric forms and elemental
biomorphism (buildings that seem to have hair,
beaks, eyes, and legs) combined with typological
variations on theaters, periscopes, funnels, traps,
chapels, and labyrinths; his thematic explorations of
falls from grace, itinerancy, passage and transforma-
tion.
Around 1975–76 Bernard Tschumi constructed
his Advertisements for Architecture—a series of
architectural montages, some of which featured
photographs of the Villa Savoy he had taken in
1965 while a student at the eth, where he found
“the squalid walls of the small service rooms on the
ground ﬂoor, stinking of urine, smeared with excre-
ment, and covered with obscene grafﬁti.” How
should we read these Advertisements? When they
have been read at all, they have been seen as an
explicit alternative to the over-privileging of pure,
autonomous form by Rossi, Eisenman, and Hejduk
(known in the 1970s as the “Whites”) and to Colin
Rowe’s inﬂuential preference for the uncorrupted,
pristine ﬂesh of Le Corbusier. Surely this reading is
correct as far as it goes. But Tschumi augments this
interpretation elsewhere, describing the Advertise-
ments project as a notational device to “trigger” the
desire for architecture—an architecture of perverse
pleasure, an erotics of architectural performance.
Tschumi: “The usual function of advertisements… is
to trigger desire for something beyond the [image
or form] itself. As there are advertisements for pro-
ducts, what not advertisements for architecture?” 
The peculiar visual logic of the Advertisements
corresponds, once again, to that archaic stage of
subject production Lacan termed the Imaginary. In
the Advertisements the subject of desire is nothing
less than architecture itself, architecture as such.
Lacan’s so-called L Schema from Écrits famously
constructs the subject of desire as an effect of a
dynamic structure of internal contradictions—inclu-
ding a relationship between the subject (S on the
left in the “graphe du désir”), the desired object (a,
on the right, the objet petite autre, denizen of the
Imaginary), and that object’s double, the ego (a’
under S), which in this case can be understand to
designate the Advertisments’ mimicry of the com-
mercialized, eroticized milieu in which they have
appeared. The system of desire (indicated by a) is
opposed to the system of identiﬁcations (indicated
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by a’). The shifting, reﬂecting, doubled relationship
between the object and the object-effect that is the
ego, is indicated in the graph by the diagonal line,
which must be read both as a vector of desire
ﬂowing between a and a’ and also as having an
implicit planar dimension, which is to say that it is
also the image-screen of Lacan’s mirror stage, as is
made explicit by the label “imaginary relation,” the
interaction staged by the mirror. Written into this
schema the Advertisements provide the objects of
desire primarily as images, of course, immanent to
the works themselves—the “morselized” photogra-
phs of the Villa Savoye are nothing if not objets a,
but so are the ropes and fatal falls and text frag-
ments (Tschumi is an absolute master at construc-
ting appropriated images, often from famous avant-
garde architecture, ﬁlm, and photography, as inten-
se, but forever lost objects of desire). But the ima-
ges themselves are nothing without the ﬂow of
desire, which they produce but which also acts as
their support. The eventing of the objets a—the
presentation of them as substitutes for an architec-
ture we want but do not have, the setting up of
them as triggers—construes them as signiﬁers and
mirrors them back to the viewer as marks of a
speciﬁc, even unique and personal, affective archi-
tectural encounter—an event: this moment of expe-
rience, this sensation of architecture condensed
here, this ﬁguring of architecture that happened for
me just now. Such is the performative dimension of
this work—to constitute the desire for architecture
out of an impossible-to-ﬁll lack, ﬁgured by part-
objects in a ﬂash of recognition.
All this so far has taken place on the side of the
Imaginary, where the architecture subject is elicited
by a movement of desire through part-objects in an
act of enunciation, an experience, a performance.
But as the L Schema makes quite clear, the more
fundamental relationship that mediates all of this
machinery is that between S, the subject of desire,
and a big Other, A. Reading the Advertisements
through the complete L Schema forces the recogni-
tion that the ﬂows of desire structuring the viewer’s
experience are projected from and return to the
locus of that Other, which Lacan calls the Symbolic
(or language, or law, or the unconscious itself
deﬁned as the “discourse of the Other”). Architec-
ture, the subject of desire, is not produced willfully
in an act of consciousness, but rather is the effect
of what is repressed. Note that in the graph, the
image-screen absorbs the vector of the unconscious
and blocks a representation of the unconscious,
even as desire is an effect of the unconscious. 
Now, at the time of the Advertisements Tschumi
does not give a name to A, the Other of this
Symbolic realm. But we know it already: it City in
the sense that Rossi ﬁrst introduced the relation of
architecture and City. This is conﬁrmed in The
Manhattan Transcripts (1977) in which it is now
Manhattan, rather than the Villa Savoy, that is the
cathexis-object—a city understood as having an
erotic, transgressive, and violent programmatic
potential woven into its grid of streets and avenues.
It is reconﬁrmed in the project for La Villette,
which returns to Eisenman’s interest in architectu-
re’s total system, but now with a concern for only
the effects, not the form of that system.
The diagram of Architecture’s Desire can now
be completed as follows:
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ANALOGUE (Rossi)
parts
analogic images
absence, loss of maternal plenitutde
Imaginary
Spatial, images
memory of place
diachronic
the iterable code
blank, white surface
realism
REPETITION (Eisenman)
total system, ground, inventory
digital codes
presence of dead father (Name of the Father)
Symbolic
Absence/presence
counter-memory, tracing place
synchronic
the reiterable code
archeology of surface traces
modernism
ENCOUNTER (Hejduk)
parts
becoming ﬁgures (affects)
trace of Architecture’s Gaze
Imaginary-Real
taking (of) place
diachronic, theatrical
the exorbitant image-ﬁgure
decorative surface
modernism/postmodernism
SPACING (Tschumi)
total system, ﬂows
grams, diagrams
transgression of Gaze
Symbolic-Real
dissolution of place
synchronic, cinegrammatic
the form-ﬁgure
projective surface
postmodernism/end-of-the-line
Note:
1 The Molino Stucky was a pasta mill and grain silo at the western end of the Giudecca designed in
late nineteenth century by Ernest Wullkopf.
